|
|
Security Situation In 1994, the election of the People's Alliance (PA) government brought a sense of hope to the country, with the PA promising to negotiate a settlement with the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE) and address issues of human rights abuse and democratisation. A few months later in January 1995 this feeling of hope continued with the first truce between the Security Forces and the LTTE in five years. A cessation of hostilities was initially declared for two weeks, beginning on 7 January and would be extended as negotiations continued. As it turned out, it lasted only three months. Negotiations focused on conditions in Jaffna, including the embargo that was in place at the time, the fishing restrictions, mainland access and a reconstruction package. No detailed proposals for a political settlement in the North and East were presented and the LTTE was the only Tamil group represented in the negotiations. Other problematic points included the disarmament process and the removal of certain army camps, such as the Ponneryn camp in the Jaffna district. The negotiations finally broke down with the LTTE accusing the government of poor implementation of agreed upon issues and stalling on further negotiations. Furthermore, issues of parity at the negotiating table were raised when the PA government chose to send "unknown" officials to the talks as opposed to major government officials. Thus, LTTE declared an end to the cessation of hostilities, highlighting this declaration with an attack on two navy boats in Trincomalee harbour on 19 April. Two planes were also shot down and assaults by the LTTE on army and police bases as well as rebel bases by the Security Forces resumed. President Chandrika Kumaratunga initially declared this a temporary setback and attempted to persuade the LTTE back to the negotiating table, but by late June the government declared it's intention to militarily defeat the LTTE. Nevertheless, there continued to be some talk amongst government officials about a constitutional settlement of the north-east issue. The remainder of the year saw a series of fierce battles, beginning in late June with a Tiger attack of Mandaithivu island off the Jaffna peninsula. The attack was a severe blow to the security forces, with a reported casualty rate of over 120. Government forces responded the following week with 'Operation Leap Forward'. The Operation, declared as an attempt to "liberate Tamil civilians in the North" from LTTE domination, met little resistance from Tiger forces. Security forces subsequently managed to capture a 78 square km portion of the Peninsula but, according to many analysts, were forced to pull back due to a lack of resources to hold on to such an expanse of territory. Civilian casualties during the operation were severe, with a reported 300 killed, 500 injured and 300,000 displaced. Meanwhile, security forces in the East were forced to pull out to facilitate operations in the North, allowing Tiger control in most areas off the main Polonaruwa-Batticaloa-Kalmunai road. The LTTE responded with a series of small attacks on army camps and police posts in the Eastern districts. Several attacks on targets in the Capital during 1995; including an explosion in August outside the Western Provincial Government Office, in October one on the two main oil refineries and in November a suicide attack on army headquarters, proved that even Colombo was not immune to the conflict. This was followed the next day by an explosion in Batticaloa. Reasons for the attacks and identities of individuals involved were never determined, although the military accused the LTTE of both. Popular sentiment at the time maintained that the Batticaloa bomb was set by the security forces in retaliation for the Colombo attack. 1996 saw a major increase in military activity from both the government forces and the LTTE. Several bomb attacks in Colombo once again brought the conflict to the south of the country. On 31 January 1996, an explosion at the Central Bank in the heart of the capital reportedly killed over 100 people, the biggest bombing to date in the history of the conflict. Two more attacks occurred later in the year, one on the Port of Colombo and the other on a rush hour commuter train, the latter of which the LTTE has denied responsibility. Back in the conflict zone, on 18 July the LTTE launched a massive attack on the Mullaitivu army base and continued its barrage in the latter half of the year with attacks in Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Ampara districts. Meanwhile, government forces were focusing their efforts primarily in the north. Operations Riveresa II and III were aimed at "clearing" and holding Jaffna while Operation Sath Jaya launched in July was centred on the town of Kilinochi in the Wanni. During most of the year, Eastern forces were primarily occupied with counter-insurgency and routine "clearing" operations, but in December 1996 Operation Singing Fish was launched. This attack was designed to overtake several LTTE bases across the lagoon from Batticaloa town. The attack was over in two days, with the military claiming to have captured large amounts of arms and ammunition from the camps. Reports state that the LTTE had withdrawn from these camps prior to the attack. This attack was followed by Operation Rivi Jaya on 31 December in the Batticaloa district and phase two of Singing Fish. Once again the LTTE offered little resistance. As the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) did not attempt to hold these bases, many observers were lead to believe that government forces did not have the resources to hold new ground in the East. Recruitment on both sides of the conflict had reportedly reached an all-time low in 1996. The Sri Lanka Army, faced with mass desertions and low turnouts for it's recruitment drives, even set an amnesty for deserters which they extended several times. This pattern continued throughout 1997. There was some talk of establishing forced conscription. An end to the conflict seemed more remote than ever as the war escalated further in 1997. It was highlighted by several major attacks by the LTTE and the government forces' May launching of the massive Operation Jaya Sikuru. Examples of attacks in 1997 include: In January, a massive attack was launched by the LTTE on the Elephant Pass- Paranthan army camp north of Kilinochi, just off the Jaffna peninsula. The camp was overrun by the LTTE and recaptured by the SLA two days later. Heavy losses were reported on both sides. In February, Operation Edi Bala was launched by the government forces. The plan was to link Vavuniya with Mannar to the west. The operation met little resistance and the road was "cleared" by 22 February. In the process, the SLA gained control of the north-western seaboard of the island, a critical area in terms of access to the Indian coast and the adjacent Willpattu jungles. Observers questioned whether the SLA had the resources to hold such a large area. The LTTE launched a simultaneous attack on China Bay Air Force Camp in Trincomalee and the military camp at Vavunativu in Batticaloa in early March. Both camps were severely damaged and over 200 LTTE cadres and 60 service personnel were killed according to Defence Ministry sources. In October, a massive bombing of the recently opened World Trade Centre and the adjacent Galadari and Hilton hotels occurred, claimed by government sources to have been an LTTE attack. The LTTE later denied the charges. This attack took place only days after the LTTE were declared a terrorist organisation by the US government under its recently implemented anti-terrorist bill. Eighteen were reported killed in the attack, including five stated LTTE cadres who were killed in the ensuing gun battle. Thirty nine foreigners were reported to have been injured in the blast. Government response included a massive roundup of Tamil civilians in the area as well as several reports of what have been called "retaliatory acts" by the security forces on other parts of the island. Security in and around Colombo has been increased substantially. Jaya Sikuru, designed to overtake the main road between Vavuniya and Kilinochi, has been the largest operation launched by the forces in the history of the conflict. Twenty thousand troops were mobilised in the two-pronged attack, severely straining the resources of the military. This operation to some emphasises the PA government's commitment to militarily defeating the LTTE. Even if the forces cannot completely defeat the Tigers, as many believe, analysts point out that a total defeat may be unnecessary as the PA government may only be seeking to splinter the LTTE thus giving the government a position of military superiority to negotiate from, if and when peace talks ever begin. As of this writing, seven months after its launching, Operation Jaya Sikuru still rages. Security Situation
Constitutional Reform and Peace Proposals As mentioned previously, prospects for peace looked good in the first four months of 1995. The cessation of hostilities and other provisions intended to lay the foundation for a peaceful settlement. Peace movement leaders initiated various programs to illustrate their support for the peace process. The government voiced it's commitment to constitutional reforms, including broad devolution of power to the districts, designed to alleviate issues of discrimination and harassment of minority communities. During this time PBI provided support for lawyers and witnesses who intended to submit petitions to the newly formed Presidential Commission investigating more than 60,000 disappearances reported between 1989 and 1994. With optimism high and positive conditions prevalent in the peace and justice community, the Sri Lanka Project began planning for closure. After the resumption of hostilities in April 1995 and the government's renewed effort to militarily defeat the LTTE, the previous momentum towards addressing human rights concerns, constitutional reform and peaceful negotiation suffered a severe setback. Although President Kumaratunga's devolution plan (a draft of which was presented in August of the same year) continued to be discussed, the primary focus once again became 'war for peace'. In late 1995 during the Riviresa campaign to re take Jaffna town there was an upsurge in anti NGO sentiments throughout the island. The Annual General Meeting of the NGO Forum in Sri Lanka was severely disrupted by mob violence. The 'unofficial' draft proposal received mixed reactions. The opposition United National Party (UNP) had some reservations but did not give any details. Strong opposition to the proposals were registered by many in the Sinhala intellectual community as well as a large section of the Buddhist Sangha. Devolution and the draft constitution remained the major dialogue throughout 1996. Contentious points included the lack of specification over the unit of devolution, the status of Buddhism and the level and type of political powers devolved to the regions. In March 1997 the Parliamentary Select Committee publicly released the first 18 chapters of the draft constitution, with no mention of the devolution proposal. As the year wore on, the debate regarding devolution seemed to have come to a stalemate. Upon the release of the draft constitution in November, which included the devolution package, the PA government asserted that they will take the matter to a referendum if they did not receive the support of the UNP. A report released by the Sinhala Commission, a body made up of members of the Buddhist Sangha, denounced the package, presenting it as a threat to Sinhala Buddhism as well as an acquiescence to the demands of the Tigers. There was some talk in the latter part of 1996 and again in 1997 of reopening dialogue with the LTTE. Various foreign officials offered their services as mediators. The government's position was that negotiations are possible only if the LTTE lays down it's arms, although one statement by the President mentioned that if the LTTE were willing to talk within a relatively short time frame, laying down of arms may not be necessary. Later indictments served against LTTE leader V. Prabhakaran raised questions as to government intentions regarding peace talks. Furthermore, the LTTE rejected any offer that included laying down of arms. Human Rights Since the return to combat in 1995, the human rights situation steadily deteriorated. Despite the election promises, the PA government did little to respond to the charges of abuse in the North and East, seemingly due to some extent to a lack of influence over the troops in the conflict zones. In the Batticaloa district there had been numerous reports of extra-judicial killings and the patterns of harassment, roundups and torture continued. The official response to these reports was mixed. The general feeling had been one of government inactivity and token gestures towards addressing these issues. Occasionally some cases were eventually addressed and prominent abuses sometimes effectively dealt with, but many abuses were argued away as isolated or less serious, thus not officially recognised as problems. The LTTE had also come under severe criticism regarding human rights abuse. LTTE forces have been reportedly responsible for the massacre of over 200 Singhalese villagers after the resumption of hostilities in April 1995. Tamil civilians had also experienced wide-spread abuse by the Tigers, in particular the forced evacuation of Jaffna which generated a refugee population from anywhere between 250,000 to 500,000. Often however it has been difficult to judge the full extent or nature of Tiger abuses, particularly in the East, as few people are willing to come forward with their complaints. The PA managed to gain some respect in 1995 from the Non Governmental Organisations (NGO) community with it's initially prompt attention to the Bolgoda Lake and Diyawanna Oya killings. The Criminal Investigation Division (CID) arrested 18 Special Task Force (STF) intelligence agents and a further 10 security personnel in connection with the killings. The case was still pending in 1997. At this time, the NGO community, especially those peace and justice oriented, was functioning with some uncertainty. The President, by their assessment, was saying the right things but not following through with the appropriate actions. Nevertheless, in 1995 some organisations began laying the foundations for addressing more directly the human rights situation and civilian costs of the war. Parliament passed legislation in 1996 establishing a National Human Rights Commission (HRC). The Commission has broader powers of monitoring and investigating than the Human Rights Task Force (HRTF), but has limited enforcement or decision making power. There were some fears that the government controlled HRC, managed by political appointees, would ultimately replace the semiautonomous HRTF. Amidst some public confusion as to it's mandate, the Human Rights Commission was finally launched in June 1997, replacing the HRTF. Without an as yet established infrastructure, some have questioned the efficacy of the Commission. Many human rights monitors, with some scepticism, have adopted a "wait and see" attitude. In May 1997, an Amnesty International bulletin stated that 648 "disappearances" were reported in the Jaffna peninsula from late 1995 to early 1997. A later report stated that 41 were reported in the first seven months of 1997 alone. The government's Board of Investigations reported of having received 730 complaints and later of having "found" 180 of those "disappeared". Amnesty claimed that they were "encouraged by these efforts" in establishing the fate of the disappeared, including reassurances by the government that reports of investigations would be made public, but in a further report accused the government of acting too slowly in it's investigations. Over 19,000 complaints of "disappearances" were filed since 1988. Labour and Economy In 1995, workers continued to struggle for improvement of their working conditions with strikes and demonstrations. Although some concerns still exist, police response has been reportedly fairly reasonable regardless of the greater latitude allowed them under the Emergency Regulations. Labour unrest continued throughout 1996. In late May, 14,000 Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB) workers went on strike to protest privatisation, causing a massive 4 day blackout. Government response was to declare electricity an essential service thus making the strike illegal under the Emergency Regulations. Workers were ordered back to their jobs with arrest orders for any no-shows. Furthermore, the Electrical Superintendent was detained without charges by the Criminal Investigations Division and the CEB union leader was shot at by unidentified gunmen. Unions for the most part had a difficult year in 1996. The traditional May Day processions were banned. The Nava Sama Samaya Party (NSSP) May Day rally was attacked and their offices were raided. Anti-union sentiment grew, with anti-strike demonstrations portraying striking workers as impeding the war effort. Although labour unrest continued in 1997, anti-union fervour subsided somewhat as other issues took centre stage in the media. May Day processions were reinstated with no violent incidents reported. While the economy in 1996 was severely battered, with price increases and privatisation concerns, defence spending increased dramatically, rising to almost 50 billion rupees in comparison with the 1995 expenditure of 32 billion. The pattern of price increases continued in 1997. Media Overall in 1995 there were fewer complaints lodged by the media regarding censorship and harassment. The chief complaint had been limited access to information, especially in the North where a ban on journalists had been imposed. This ban forced media representatives to rely upon dubious sources for information and conflicting reports received from the Ministry of Defence. Local and international journalists have called upon the government to allow greater access to information. However restrictions of various sorts against journalists were still quite strong. Most notably this came in the form of lawsuits being issued against journalists by the President and other politicians, outbursts by the President against various newspapers and the imposition of censorship on military related news. The competent authority put in charge of the censorship process went on to censor items which were only vaguely related to military news. In addition the British Broadcasting Corporation World Service television reports on Sri Lanka were regularly scrambled. Media censorship was further imposed on 18 April 1996, with the President asserting that newspapers hindering the war effort will be shut down. Censorship on war and north/east news was eventually lifted in October, however travel restrictions to the north remained, stifling information flow from the conflict zones. Information control tightened substantially with the advent of Operation Jaya Sikuru in 1997. Some members of the media have claimed that the government and the military have adopted media control tactics similar to those employed by the Pentagon during the Persian Gulf war, giving "tours" of the conflict areas to pools of select journalists. In 1997 a Sri Lanka Broadcast Bill was presented to Parliament by the Media Minister. The Bill established licensing conditions that many felt to be restrictive. After a series of protests and petitions by media personnel and others, the Supreme Court, upon review, found the Bill to be unconstitutional. The government is still considering proposing some form of new media legislation. Elections The political process in 1996 showed very little signs of progress. Elections first postponed in early 1995 were once again postponed until the end of 1996. To carry through this postponement, the government was legally obliged to either amend electoral law or call an island-wide state of emergency. A state of emergency was eventually declared with the government denying the emergency was used as a tool to postpone the elections. Local elections finally took place in March 1997, with the PA emerging as the victor. The course of the campaign was marred by more than 1800 incidents of violence (as reported by the election monitoring group PAFFREL), including the assassination of MP Nalanda Ellawela. It was arguably the most violent election in the history of Sri Lanka. This inter-party violence and other charges of election law violations has led to a call for serious reform in election laws. There has been some talk of holding an island wide provincial council election sometime in the first months of 1998, but no date has been confirmed. Political Process
The East After the collapse of the cessation of hostilities in 1995, relations between civilians and the military deteriorated to some degree. In 1996, however, these relations reportedly improved somewhat, although conditions had generally worsened. In the Batticaloa district, instances of retaliatory violence, random shelling, harassment, restricted access for fishermen and paddy field workers, physical abuse, torture, and arbitrary detentions were reported. There were also some reports of forced labour committed by the Special Task Force in the Ampara district. According to local sources, relations in 1996 between the security forces and civilians in Trincomalee town were also somewhat improved, with the security forces beginning to respond somewhat to civilian needs. Suspicion between the forces and the civilians, however, still ran very deep, highlighted by frequent reports of cordon and search operations, round-ups and harassment. The outlying villages faced much greater difficulty: reports of harassment were greater and often arbitrary limits were imposed by the forces on supply transport and general civilian movement. These problems, which compounded the scarcity of jobs, food, and health care in the outlying areas, caused many people to migrate into Trincomalee town. There was some concern of further violence and harassment after the assassination of two MPs in the Trincomalee district in July 1997, however much of the tension following these incidents has since subsided. Local NGOs reportedly faced many obstacles in the outlying villages of Trincomalee. Sources indicate reports of harassment at checkpoints and arbitrary restrictions, resulting in many local NGOs containing their operations in government controlled areas. A few sources did cite some difficulty with the LTTE, although others reported that no unreasonable constraints had been applied. Apparently the LTTE, in both Batticaloa and Trincomalee, had been looking to encourage NGOs to work in areas under their control. During the period 1995-1997, militant groups reportedly continued to operate throughout the east. In Batticaloa, the team heard allegations of a People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) run torture chamber, extortion, and arbitrary arrest. PBI's Emergency Response Network was activated in 1996 in relation to this situation. Other armed groups operating both in Trincomalee and Batticaloa include Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO) and Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) as well as various groups of home guards, all functioning as independent security forces, often reportedly in conjunction with the security forces. In the Trincomalee district the focus of these groups appeared to be in the outlying villages, thus adding to the difficulty in substantiating the various allegations. The LTTE continued it's pattern of disruption in the east, regularly blowing up train tracks, phone and power lines. A series of bus highjackings and instances of impromptu checkpoints were reported in Batticaloa several times over the period. The years 1996 and 1997 saw a reported increase in recruitment, especially in the Batticaloa district. Reports have been cited of extortion letters sent to Batticaloa residents who had no choice but to go out of town to an arranged spot to drop their payment. Upon returning they were often harassed by the forces, claiming the forces committed acts of extortion as well. As a result of the LTTE's actions, some had reported a seemingly marked decrease in support of the LTTE amongst the civilian population, but this is debatable Jaffna Meanwhile in Jaffna, August 1996 figures estimate the number of returnees evacuated from the peninsula by the LTTE in November 1995, at 600,000. Various sources claim the security forces have been relatively "well behaved". This was further confirmed in 1997 reports. As of 1996 some International Non Governmental Organisations (INGOs) reported that they were allowed to work in Jaffna again, although sources from Jaffna later indicated that the situation was far from normal: supplies are severely short and as yet there is no civil administration. December 1996 reports claim an increase in the number of disappearances. Furthermore, human rights agencies raised doubts as to the independence of a Defence Ministry appointed committee investigating these disappearances. This was further supported by a report released by Amnesty International in 1997 (see Human Rights). By late 1997, efforts to "normalise" conditions in Jaffna have continued, with some encouraging reports regarding supply transfers and civilian-military relations. Several INGOs have begun development and assistance projects in the region. In addition, there has been talk of elections aimed at restoring civilian administration. Displaced As of late 1997, with Operation Jaya Sikuru in full swing, there have been government reports of 70,000 displaced people stranded in the Vanni; other sources quote much higher figures. Many have made their way to Vavuniya in the hope of finding food, shelter, and possible access to Jaffna or elsewhere. Transport to Jaffna has been intermittent due to recent attacks on ships by the LTTE, creating dangerously overcrowded conditions in the transit camps and shelters. Food and medical supplies are scarce and often restricted. Reports from Vavuniya indicate that malnutrition, malaria, and dysentery in the region have been rapidly increasing. PBI Sri Lanka Project, 28/01/98 Civilians in the conflict
The above text may freely be reproduced, copied, or translated,
in whole or in part, as long as the source is stated as:
Peace Brigades International.
formatted by pgordon@gn.apc.org