This is a summation of various local newspaper, magazine, and bulletin
articles. It covers the period between the end of December '96 and the
beginning of January '97. This is indeed a short period of time in the context
of the Sri Lankan conflict but nevertheless portrays an accurate picture of
the current situation.
Two major operations were launched by the Sri Lankan Army in the east province late in December last year. Security Forces launched an offensive codanamed "Rivi Jaya" and reportedly the troops advanced towards jungle bases of the LTTE in the Batticaloa district (Daily News, 01/01/97). Allegedly troops succeeded in overrunning several LTTE bases. Previously the air forces which provided air cover had been dropping leaflets on villages in a bid to minimise civilian casualties in the operational area by requesting people to vacate their homes. Unlike Jaffna, which has a flat open terrain, the topography of Batticaloa, with its large jungle areas, mountains, and rivulets is ideally suited for the type of guerrilla warfare the LTTE is engaging in. Army sources say the latest tactic resorted to by the LTTE was to mount large-scale attacks on the security force camps using a strong Tiger contingent and destroying the camps completely. The most recent attack had followed this pattern, where waves of LTTE cadres had mounted a fierce attack on various camps. Usually the number of Tigers taking part in these raids was far in excess of the number of troops manning the camps situated mostly in remote parts of the east (The Sunday Leader, 05/01/97). During the same time SLA troops backed by armour, artillery and air support mounted the second phase of operation "Singing Fish" in the Ampara-Batticaloa sector (The Island, 01/01/97). The SLA took empty LTTE's camps, destroyed their crops and supplies left behind by the fleeing Tigers and than left the area without fortifying it. According to our sources a great number of civilians were displaced in the area because of the military operations but are now slowly returning to their villages.
Meanwhile the problem being faced by thousands of Tamils stranded in the northern province and held in transit camps in Vavuniya awaiting security clearance to enter the south continued to be the focus of discussion between one of the Tamil political parties, the TULF, and the Government . An official figure of 177,971 people not provided with relief but requiring assistance in the Vanni District was given in December by the Commissioner for Rehabilitation. Following a great deal of confusion regarding the actual numbers of displaced people a 3-member Committee has been appointed to inquire into statistics of displacement since there are contradicting figures even in official statements. The camps themselves are over-crowded, the cooked food is of poor quality, sanitation facilities are minimal and the allocation of finances allocation provided by the State grossly inadequate (Inform - December '96). Despite the assurance that certain categories of people are allowed to leave the camps, the reality seems to be that the bureaucratic procedures involved place major hurdles before even who are eminently qualified to leave (Inform - December '96). The strict security around the camps also means that they are inaccessible to journalists and others who could expose the reality of the situation within. However, since the visit of the TULF's MPs and of a medical team led by an UNP's MP, there has been some exposure of the actual conditions (Inform - December '96).
In Jaffna, troops which launched Operation Tiger Hunt on December 30th succeeded in clearing a further five kilometres to the east of captured areas (Sunday Leader, 05/01/97). PLOTE and EPRLF have opened their political offices in Jaffna, following the EPDP which opened its office early in January. EPDP and PLOTE have their own armed security. The EPRLF, which asked the Government for police security, was offered military security instead. The Government has explained that there was insufficient police personnel to be spared for this purpose. The offer was refused by the EPRLF which said they would manage their own security (Colombo Calling n.2, 23/01/97).
LTTE suffered casualties during a five hour gun battle in the Trincomalee district on the 4th of January. The confrontation took place when troops returning to the camp came under heavy fire by the LTTE. Troops backed by reinforcement counterattacked the LTTE. Tiger casualty figures were not immediately known. During the battle, three soldiers were also killed and thirteen others injured (Daily News, 06/01/97).
Another two pronged assault north of Paranthan and south-west of Elephant
Pass (north province) was launched by several hundred LTTE cadres on the 9th
of January around 3:00 p.m.. The LTTE in the first hours of the battle were
able to cut off the troops in Paranthan-Kilinochchi area from Elephant Pass.
The attack was aimed at smashing defences and destroying artillery positions
situated between Elephant Pass and Paranthan. Reports from the north said
that arms, ammunition and some equipment belonging to the army had been
captured by the attackers. However the Defence Ministry in a communiquŽ issued
soon after claimed that no guns were captured by the attackers (The Island,
10/01/97). Whilst Tiger cadres pinned down troops on the western flank at
Paranthan, the main attack was launched from the east. Wave after wave of
attackers maintained a continuous onslaught. Some two hours after dawn, Tigers
had succeeded in creating a gap in the contiguous defence that extended from
Elephant Pass through Paranthan to Kilinochchi. By the evening of the same
day, the army counterattacking columns had linked up and restored the
defensive position (The Sunday Times, 12/01/97). The army, aided by heavy air
strikes, were able to repulse the multipronged LTTE assault. This attack was
the biggest LTTE attack in the Elephant Pass area since the abortive attempt
to destroy the Elephant Pass army base in July 1991 and the biggest Tiger
strike since the battle of Mullaitivu last summer. This also resulted in the
destruction and loss of a number of pieces of heavy artillery, stocks of
ammunition, and other stores of the SL army (Sunday Observer, 12/01/97).
Military officials said that 142 soldiers have been killed and 294 wounded and
more than 500 cadres of the LTTE members killed. But LTTE said only 140 of
their cadres perished in the attack (The Sunday Leader, 12/01/97).
Correction and Addendum
In the "Sri Lanka Team Report" in March 1996 we wrote, regarding a remembrance for Dr. Rajani Thiranagama of University Teachers for Human Rights and journalist Richard De Soysa organised by Women for Peace in Colombo, that they "were both killed by security forces for their work as writers trying to provide people with a balanced view of the events." The information given is not completely correct. The individuals responsible for Dr. Thiranagama's death are unknown. However, it is alleged that Dr. Thiranagama was killed by the LTTE whilst she was in Jaffna. PBI Sri Lanka Project regrets the error.