The thirteenth bulletin from the PBI team in Haiti focuses on the capacities and resources of the Haitian society for managing conflict. We want it to provoke reflection about the team's work in this field, which is of particular importance not only since developments in the political situation regularly make us reassess the relevance of our approach, but also so that new PBI volunteers can join the debate.
In the first place, we need to focus our attention on the relevance of the term 'conflict management'. In Western countries, conflict management rapidly becomes fashionable when deterioration in living conditions lead to widespread social tension and violence. We must avoid papering over the cracks in extreme situations, instead of attacking the roots of the problems, at the risk of encouraging fatalism and passivity.
Given the situation in Haiti, what problems deserve being treated as conflicts? What do we really mean by the this term and what is the significance of learning to manage conflicts in a more positive fashion? Where can conflicts be identified? How can they be dealt with? Looking at the actual situation in the country, one can easily sound overly angelic or highly reductive when using the term 'conflict'.
Top-level political clashes have worsened since President Rene Préval dissolved Parliament after two tiers of the Chamber of Senators and the Administration Councils of Municipal Sections backed a controversial law. The new Prime Minister, Jacques Edouard Alexis, has definitely been accepted by Parliament but, since there has still been no clear presentation of policy guidelines, he and his new government have yet to be ratified by the deputies.
A working group made up of representatives from the government, opposition and Civil Society organisations have formed the basis of a new Provisional Electoral Council (CEP), entrusted with preparing free, credible and democratic elections. Although this beginning is promising, it should be noted that the Organisation of People in Struggle (OPL), one of the strongest and best organised parties, has withdrawn. The CEP will try to contact all leading sectors and groups in society and the international community in order to draw up election guidelines.
In tandem with the political crises, crime has risen significantly (as many as two dozen deaths can be counted after a weekend in Port-au-Prince) and politically motivated killings are no longer the exception. In January President Préval's sister was shot and seriously wounded. Since that attack, threatening and killing of politically prominent people and human rights workers has become the order of the day. An OPL senator has been gunned down and a doctor shot dead while working in his hospital. A leading member of the Platform of Human Rights Organisations survived an attempt on his life, while a well-known Port-au-Prince militant, a member of the Lafanmi Lavalas party, was riddled with bullets. These are only a few examples of a seemingly endless series of shootings - not to mention the victims of organised crime acting with apparent impunity in the face of weak state authority.
The power struggles could conceivably be resolved but at present they are highly visible, and the Haiti National Police (PNH) has done little to maintain its image. No investigation into reported incidents has yet produced any results. Clearly, at this level, it's not a question of a lack of capacity to manage conflict but one of a struggle for power, and one hopes that democratic factions will one day control the field. We should go back to basics and ask what are the links between the sphere of high politics and the grass roots situation? How can the customs, education, training and attitudes of the people play a part in the democratisation process? How should one intervene at this level to encourage an improvement in the human rights situation and the evolution of a peaceful society?
At this point we should hear what Haitians and specialists working in this field have to say, in order to understand their points of view and perhaps learn something which can help in future projects.
The investigating unit of the Office of International Lawyers was set up under the Aristide government with the aim of helping the Haitian judiciary carry out judicial inquiries into cases of human rights violations perpetrated both before the coup d'etat as well as during the 1991-1994 regime. Composed of Haitian and US lawyers, it has helped significantly in preparing trial dossiers related to the 24 April 1994 Raboteau massacre in the Gonaives quarter, and the FRAPH fire in the Port-au-Prince 'bidonville', Cite Soleil, on 27 December 1993. We interviewed US lawyer Brian Concannon on the progress, prospects and relevance of his work.
PBI: Good morning, Brian. Are these trials just a political game? To what extent is it realistic to continue with them? Will popular indifference allow them to go on forever?
BC: First of all, politically, the trials are no longer a key element in the game. Both the government as well as the prime minister and other ministers are aware that there are enormous advantages in handling the trials well. In any case, they stand to gain a lot of popular support if they do. On the other hand - and one shouldn't forget this - there are risks if the work is not done adequately. This undoubtedly explains why the government is moving ahead cautiously with the dossier, because it wants to win. As far as the people are concerned, they probably are discouraged. But one of the things which continues to surprise me when I speak with the victims is that, even though they may be superficially frustrated, they are in no way ready to give up the fight. I remember reading what one plaintiff said in the trial of the 1988 St Jean Bosco massacre. She said: "We have seen years and years of struggle. Now we are truly exhausted and are not sure we can continue to struggle. We have to have justice." If you think of what has happened since, the Haitians have endured so much, and yet they continue to struggle! As far as the trials we are working on are concerned, especially the Raboteau one, we've received excellent cooperation from victims. In the St Jean Bosco trial, we made it known that we wanted to speak with victims and close to one hundred people came to see us, most of them from Cite Soleil. These people were worried, they knew there were risks, yet they continued to come. They said that if we could do something serious and there was a chance that it would work out, then they were with us.
PBI: Do you think that, thanks to these rulings, you can re-establish people's faith in the political process? To what extent do you think a democratic society can be established?
BC: There are many people in Haiti who believe that the people are in charge of their own destiny, that they are ready to make sacrifices, as they have already shown. For example, to instill confidence in electoral politics, the 'chefs' have to be seen as genuinely representing the needs of the electorate. I think this is exactly what we've seen in the drop in electoral participation. This clearly seems to show that people have said, wait, we've made sacrifices, we've gone to the polls and we've still got nothing, so we're no longer interested. It's the same problem with the judicial system. It may be that some people have confidence in the Juges de Paix, but if it's a question of seeing the interests of the least powerful set against the most powerful, I think very few people share that confidence. They no longer see the judicial system as something that's capable of affirming and defending their rights, but as something that ought to do so. If you ask people what is wrong with Haiti, the majority say the economy, because that is what directly affects them. But the second thing will be justice. I find this encouraging, the fact that people constantly complain about justice. At least they recognize that things don't have to be like this.
PBI: What are the advantages and disadvantages of being international lawyers rather than Haitians?
BC: Right now, within the office, we are equal proportions, half US and half Haitian; and I would like to see the proportion of Haitians increase. As foreigners we have the freedom of not having to worry about anything except the trials. By contrast, if you're a lawyer in your own country, instead of from somewhere else, you also have to pay attention to your future relationships with judges, ministers and, of course, other lawyers. I can make an enemy of whomever I want. The most important thing for me is to move the trial forward. Another advantage is that we bring another perspective. In the same way with foreign lawyers in the United States, bringing another perspective would be an advantage. As far as disadvantages are concerned - and this is why I'm strongly in favor of national trials rather than international tribunals such as in Rwanda - is that, in order to build lasting confidence in the judicial system, it's very important that this is done as much as possible by Haitians. Good judges, good lawyers and good logisticians are needed. One of our tasks is to provide the assistance a preliminary judge needs in order to do his job well. As foreigners we can, to a certain extent, provide this support. But there are some things foreigners cannot and will not be able to do, especially regarding relationships with judges and knowledge of the local system.
PBI: Do you think there are advantages to giving priority to high-profile trials, whether they have a real or symbolic effect, or is it more important to handle all trials in the same way?
BC: Some trials have a symbolic effect and can provide real comfort to victims. This is the case with trials like the Cite Soleil fire and the Raboteau massacre. These are trials which can reach to the highest levels, and even the people of Jeremie will be happy that the Raboteau trial was held and that the authors were judged, because people feel they can see justice being done for themselves.
PBI: Do you think there's a real possibility that Raoul Cedras, Jean-Claude Duvalier or Toto Constant will be extradited?
BC: Yes. I think there's a very good chance that Duvalier will be extradited. I would say that, among the three, he is actually in the riskiest position. There is a committee in France, the Committee to Judge Duvalier, that is putting pressure on French authorities, and I would say that, faced with pressure to try him in France or Haiti, the authorities would seriously consider extraditing him to Haiti.
The Cedras case is less obvious. He is in Panama, with Biambi and Cerano, who fled to Guatemala at the beginning of the 90s. They tried to extradite him, but were refused by Panama, as they have also been refused for Cedras and Biambi. So there are at least four people in other countries who have had requests for their extradition refused. I believe there must have been an agreement of some sort and that, as a result, these people will not be released. This might have been an agreement between Panama and the United States, it might be an affinity between Panama and the people themselves, or there may have been economic advantages. It simply means it will be more difficult to put pressure on Panama for Cedras than on France for Duvalier.
I know a good deal of work has been done since the Pinochet trial began in Great Britain, I know that France has profited from the occasion to issue arrest warrants. As a result there is a growing voice in France calling for Baby Doc to be brought to trial. Another advantage of France is pressure from African countries. I've heard, both from Africans in France and on francophone African radio, that France has received a lot of criticism for taking Duvalier in. So I believe there are a number of ways that pressure can be put on France to hand over Duvalier, and I don't think they have many reasons for not handing him over. It's something which could, therefore, be done quite easily.
Finally, there's the case of Toto Constant. His case seems to me to be the most difficult. The US State Department has said that his presence in its country is in line with foreign policy. The justification for this is that he was a death squad leader and that the United States is supposed to support democracy in Haiti. His presence on their territory shows that their commitment in favor of human rights in Haiti is less than 100%. The Court has pronounced in favor of this logic, and for the same reasons has ordered that he be expelled. This was three years ago, and he still hasn't been expelled, so one has to ask if he ever will be. What more do you need than a judge to say that this person is a criminal and should be sent back to Haiti to face trial?
PBI: And then there are the FRAPH documents. Are these still potentially useful?
BC: Yes, very useful. Concretely, in our trial, they would help a lot. We need these documents in order to reach the people who, in my opinion, are most to blame. Raoul Cedras was not in Raboteau on 22 April 1994, nor was Michel Francois, but they are the intellectual authors of the massacre. Most of the trials of people who were arrested are based on eyewitness accounts, which are solid. If we have credible and trustworthy witnesses who state that such and such a person was sitting on his tank and opened fire with his weapon, this is enough to have him condemned. We don't need written proof saying that he was there that day.
PBI: But is there any interest in seeing him tried, or should one be pursuing the people who gave the orders?
BC: I think all of them should be pursued. The hardest thing is pursuing those who gave the orders, which is why the documents would help things immensely. I'm convinced they would help us pursue people like Constant, members of the military and/or paramilitary leadership. Above all, it would allow people to feel that something was really taking place. Until the documents are returned, people are not going to believe in justice. It seems curious to me that the United States should do all this, tell people they have to live according to the law, that they must respect the law, when Haitians who hear this just laugh because they know the United States doesn't live by its own rules. I believe some of the US efforts are laudable, in the sense that, yes, it's good to have people who live according to the law, who promote the law. That is one of the reasons why I do what I do. But I also find the US hypocrisy in telling people they must live according to the law, even though they themselves don't do so, in effect weakens those efforts because it simply makes people more cynical. As for any chance of the documents being returned, there hasn't been any progress in a long time. Our strategy is to build a large and persistent campaign, and that's what we've done.
Volunteers: Departures and Arrivals
Alfred Largange's departure at the end of December 1998 did nothing to prepare us for the 'ménage' reshuffle of early 1999. The arrival in January of our first German representative, Boris Friele, was followed by that of Vincent Louis from Belgium and, at the end of January, by Benno Vorklage from Holland. Then in February, it was Switzerland's turn to be represented on the team by Frédérique Rebetez. Finally, the Dutch presence was reinforced by the arrival early April of Martijn Koning.
On the other hand, Charles Onians left us at the end of March and Thomas Noirfalisse at the beginning of June.
From One House to Another
After this year, the project would like to function with six full-time team members.
In these conditions, it has been difficult to live in Ruelle Waag, where the living space vital for fully functioning private and professional lives just wasn't available. After looking at various places, the team moved to 25 Rue Chochotte, in the Babiole quarter. The 27 February annual PBI party marked goodbye to three years of faithful and friendly service. On March 1st we turned the page.
Peace Trainers Group
The first Training of Trainers, second level, took place in December 1998. The aim was to boost the autonomy of the Group of Trainers for Peace (GFP). The subjects covered were organizational strengthening of the GFP and the development of useful teaching methods and tools. Two outside participants contributed with participatory discussions. PBI's presence took the form of logistical support. A Peace Education Guide emerged from this training session, and a decision by the members of the Group of Trainers for Peace to meet again to set up itself up as a Non-Governmental Organization. Some 30 GFP members held a preliminary meeting in February to discuss the organization's statutes. PBI was present as an observer. The GFP group met again in March to continue the work. The next Training of Trainers session was due to take place during August. It's important to distinguish clearly between GFP, a group steadily gaining its own autonomy outside PBI, and our own on-going training aimed at encouraging an ever-larger space for democratization. It is entirely up to new trainees whether or not they wish to join GFP.
There were again many other stoppages which hampered the continuity of the team's work. Carnival time was an excellent opportunity to meet the country and, of necessity, take some time to travel. From mid-February, new volunteers began coming and going on 'immersion' trips to the countryside to understand Haiti better, as well as to be able to carry on the work of the team. Finally, there was the jump from theory to practice, demanding a lot of courage, time and attention from "old hands" working to maintain continuity.
The idea grew out of a number of discussions with the PBI team's Haitian partners. The first Training for Trainers course in positive conflict management was organized and facilitated by Philippe Beck, a specialist in the field, and took place in June and July 1996. Four more courses have been held since then, and the Group of Trainers for Peace (GFP) now counts 55 Haitian members involved in teaching active non-violence. After three years of working on an informal basis, the GFP has decided to give itself legal status, and to put methods of work in place aimed at guaranteeing its development.
Positive conflict management is made even harder by constant institutional or structural obstacles, the existence of cultural differences and the country's instability. Nevertheless, valuable techniques exist which can help those interested in managing - and at times more efficiently resolving - their conflicts. Personal listening and communicating skills, as well as a well-grounded psychological understanding of interpersonal relationships, can make it possible to work constructively with others while avoiding the kinds of behavior that feed and exacerbate conflict. All training courses are based on participation, using methods aimed at using the knowledge and experience of participants as a teaching resource. The GFP strives to master and adapt these techniques in jointly-run sessions, notably alongside PBI members holding workshops on positive conflict management issues. The aim of this collaborative effort is to adapt the theoretical value of the learning activities to those of the reality in Haiti.
We talked with two members of the GFP about their work and motivation.
Jocelyn Colas (member since 1997): "I work for the National Episcopal Commission for Justice and Peace, an organization promoting and defending human rights. My Christian faith first lead me to join the socio-cultural activity group run by the St Pierre parish in Pétonville. I offered to help. As a Christian I felt it my duty to do something to help others, especially in the atmosphere of fear which ruled after the coup d'état. But parish activities were essentially organized for Catholic Christians, and this restriction motivated me to get involved with Justice and Peace, whose activities reached more people. I wanted to help the smallest, those unable to stand up for their rights. Justice and Peace reached this sector of the population, while respecting the social doctrines of the church. It was through this work that I came across PBI. I followed the 1997 Training for Trainers course, after which I joined the GFP, finding that its work complemented my own. My main motivation as a peace trainer is to provide people with techniques for resolving their conflicts without having to go through the judicial system, which I see as corrupt and violent. In my opinion, the techniques used in these workshops are not fully adapted to the culture of this country, and one shouldn't rely on them entirely. For example, the concept of consensus is not popular, while the traditional Haitian approach to conflict management focuses on mediation and reconciliation. Adapting techniques to Haitian culture remains a key issue, constantly under discussion. But I remain convinced that participatory methods are a valuable way of teaching non-violence. Working for peace education is working for justice, giving everyone their rights and dues and, to the smallest among us, the same right to life as everyone else."
Jean Saurel Beaujour (member since 1997): "By profession I'm an electrician but, for some years now, my desire to see the development of a civil society in Haiti has taken me in another direction. The list of activities that I'm now involved in includes community development, union work, militancy alongside popular organizations, as well as active participation in the GFP. My motivation for this work is purely a desire to build peace, which I see as the basis of development in Haiti. In my eyes, the violent conflicts which trouble this country make the situation unstable and not suited to developing a civil society. So we need to begin by changing this mentality of violence, using participatory methods of positive conflict management that allow us to avoid violent acts. In order to increase its impact, I think GFP should organize seminars in schools, as well as taking part in radio and television programs. I see the role of group members as messengers who have to integrate themselves with the march for democracy."
Conflict Management Methods in Haiti
"Haiti was born in pain" were the first words said to us by Pierre-Junior Constant, a preliminary court judge active in Justice and Peace and a working member of the Justice Reform Preparatory Commission as well as a member of the GFP. His numerous roles made us believe that he would have a fairly precise idea about violence in Haiti, its historic and structural causes, and the methods for improving the situation. So, we took advantage of his analysis to develop our view of this state of affairs.
Haiti, a Country of Historic Conflicts?
For the majority of generations of Haitians, slavery was their only life on this earth. The first colonists arrived on the island driven by a desire to exploit, to enrich themselves through savagery if necessary. It required a huge amount of courage from those who came from Africa to grasp their freedom, and then to defend it. Haiti came into being in 1804, though this was no more than the beginning of a long struggle for independence. Dictators, invasions and outside interference were the keystones of its history. This struggle for survival in the face of an internal enemy or the greed of the international community, has left the spirit of the Haitian people nursing many wounds.
The Roots of Violence
"From the beginning, the ancestors of today's Haitians were obliged by force and violence to leave their home villages. Through slavery, the only message of the relationship with the white man, the 'blanc', was a message of hate and contempt. Conflict between Haiti and its oppressors has always existed. The international community and the blancs as a whole, with all they have so clearly represented in the history of this country including recent events such as the flooding of the country with international organizations, and their interfering policies are at the heart of numerous conflicts. The country's internal instability, especially at a political level, is also one of the main causes of violence and insecurity. Dictators and coups have followed one after another. More democratic methods have been tried more than once. But the lack of means and will on the part of the actors concerned has always resulted in a mediocre situation," said Pierre-Junior Constant.
Corruption and gaps in the State justice system have obliged people to adopt their own methods for resolving conflict. According to Pierre-Junior Constant, it is by filling the gaps in an inadequate system that these open and alarming conflicts can be managed in a non-violent and positive manner. There are also many latent conflicts, generated by the socio-economic differences that divide Haitians. The will to survive on the street or in a 'bidonville' brings with it different forms of violence. In the first place, there's internalized violence towards oneself as well as the kind of transport, work and living conditions which people suffer. In addition, economic inequality, more than jealousy, generate discrimination at every level, in education, the administration and the work place.
Today's conflicts are the same as yesterday's. Of course, there have been changes. The actors have changed, but the differences which divide a family or village have not disappeared. Lets take, for example, the land conflicts throughout the country. Far from disappearing with agrarian reform - begun in 1995 by INARA (the National Agrarian Reform Institute) - they've merely been exacerbated by a redistribution that peasant smallholders consider unequal. The conflicts between 'grandons' and farmers recalls the relationship between a colonist and his managers or, to go a little further, between a master and his slave. These open conflicts, at times very violent, have begun to find some form of resolution through the mediation of commissions created by the government, such as the Governmental Commission set up in January 1995. INARA has now been given this role under Article 4h of the April 1995 decree. Listening to statements from numerous peasant smallholders in the Artibonite however, it seems this decree has not achieved the results hoped for. Land conflicts are only one example among others, chosen because we meet them every day. But they are the source of many inheritance problems and, in a country where land remains an important heritage, a source of conflicts of power at the heart of an organization or village.
Traditional Methods of Managing Conflict
Africa, the historic land of origin for many Haitians, is also the birthplace of a method of positive conflict management through self criticism. This cultural solution, according to Pierre Junior Constant, may once have been imported to Hispaniola by slaves, but the whole tradition was then annihilated by the servitude which followed. However, other traditions have survived and successfully resisted extinction. Elders remain dominant in all family-related conflicts and within micro societies. Recognition of their wisdom has resisted the passage of time. Their intervention remains informal, since they don't think of themselves as accomplishing any particular mission. They are simply doing what is expected of them naturally. People of note (mostly those who have received a certain amount of education) possess responsibility within the community as well as being leaders the process of managing conflict. In addition, other authorities such as hougans, priests and official authorities are all liable to intervene. As far as the religious field is concerned, Haiti's great spiritual tradition gives a lot of power to its representatives. Not only does the priest often act as mediator, but the church is also seen as a place for listening, talking and, above all, as neutral terrain where accords can be agreed.
Reconciliation Processes in Haiti
Pierre-Junior Constant, having taken part in the work of Haiti's Justice Reform Commission, was keen to tell us about what already existed and what had to be developed in the future. He wanted to make it clear that he was in no way a spokesperson for the commission. Getting the reforms underway would, he believed, be difficult. It would need a lot of time, work and patience. Article 49 of the civil legal code includes reconciliation procedures. These procedures are only envisaged when the human and financial issues involved are minor. A Justice of the Peace is the competent authority. Legally, the procedure aims to free up the case loads of tribunals by finding solutions that are satisfactory and acceptable to all parties, and therefore more easily carried out. However, this option is rarely used, for two main reasons.
On the one hand, the parties involved are poorly informed about the procedure and how it works. On the other, competent magistrates are inadequately trained in the field. In civil matters, parties can ask for their case to go for reconciliation. But, through a lack of awareness, this procedure is hardly ever put into practice. When individuals come before a judge, they wait for the case in question to be dealt with in an authoritative and definitive manner by the judge. Often, if some attempt at reconciliation has taken place, it has been outside the court room. In penal matters, public action is up to society. It's up to the public minister to propose an amicable settlement for minor crimes and misdemeanors. But, in concrete terms, it's those who are better off who request reconciliation. The problem worsens when their lawyers complicate the case by seeking to gain disproportionate advantage from the procedure.
Numerous initiatives have already been taken or are planned, notably ones aimed at improving the training of judges in this field. One of the most important initiatives has been the creation of the School of Magistrates for the 1987 Constitution. This opened its doors in January 1995. Going beyond learning legal measures, the training provides a scientific approach to reconciliation through an in-depth study of its broader elements, such as active listening, neutrality and facilitation. And it insists on the drawing up of a verbal statement of reconciliation to close the procedure.
Nevertheless, measures will be taken to avoid reconciliation playing an overriding role in a judge's duty to rule on the rights of a case. In addition, reconciliation must not become a way for the most powerful party, or the judge himself, to profit from the situation. Lastly, Article 91 of a decree issued in August 1995 by the Judiciary Organization ruled: "As reconciliation judges, justices of the peace must make every effort to reach a settlement between the parties present before them." This decree merely reinforces a long-standing procedure inscribed in the civil legal codes. One of the main reform aims is to review these codes, with the debate focussing on institutionalizing mediation and reconciliation techniques.
What Needs to be Done?
It's often worth getting an outside opinion on the work we do. A more objective view and one based on a local standpoint can help us understand both our mistakes and our successes. Working on the principle that criticism is what can help a project move forward, and not being scared of what may be uncovered, I asked Pierre-Junior Constant - a member of the Group of Trainers for Peace and thus someone very close to PBI - to give his opinion of the effectiveness of the Haiti project, faced as it is by the multiple conflicts of Haitian society.
Pierre-Junior first heard of PBI through a Justice and Peace (Jilap) seminar held in Aquin in April 1998. Dominique Eugène (a member of the Peace Trainers Group) and PBI volunteer Chantal Sergeant facilitated a workshop on conflict management. Through this first contact, the participatory approach and the facilitators' commitment to peace convinced him of the soundness of this approach. In addition, it left him eager to maintain contact with PBI with the aim of attending a more complete Training for Trainers course. This he did in July of the same year.
In the first place, it seemed to him that PBI and Jilap shared the same ideals. PBI teaches how to apply a peace philosophy to a specific space, and Jilap does the same in its own way. Later, however, he realized PBI had demarcation lines, that its field of action was much more limited. He respected this, realizing suddenly that one condition of this specialization was the value of taking time to know the terrain, the culture and the kind of training appropriate in each case. According to Pierre-Junior, PBI can't explore the way of life of the people it addresses too much. Poverty, illiteracy and secular exploitation inherited from the savageries of colonial rule, are among the study areas which could be covered by PBI.
After collaborating with PBI in various ways, he has noticed that our training, even though greatly simplified, remains inaccessible to certain sectors of the population. He realizes that it's difficult for foreigners to understand and come to grips with a country like Haiti. In addition, the rapid turnover of volunteers (even one year is far too little) doesn't give them enough time to immerse themselves fully in the needs and anxieties of the people they work with. He urges us to take time to get to know the people who make up this country, to apply ourselves to establishing deep contacts with our partners, developing the kind of real trust that will allow us to realize the full value of our work.
Today, powerless to struggle alone in the face of violent elements linked to international crime networks, the Haitian police forces find themselves even more ill equipped to fight the hard-to-localize phenomenon of structural violence. Imported violence, violence within the population itself and reinvented violence are among the major challenges facing this young institution. Nevertheless, some voices, emerging notably from civil society organizations, have made themselves heard, and discussion and debate has focussed passionately on a new concept of the role of the police in the reborn Haitian democracy. As a result, a range of Community Police projects are beginning to emerge here and there throughout the country.
However, this concept of a Community Police doesn't suggest a new police force different from the PNH. It's more a question of 'using what there is' to encourage professional behavior by police agents as well as the police institution as such. It involves, for example, a participatory and dynamic process. This is aimed at constantly improving relations between the population and its police, without hostility and without the latter appearing as an outsider. Nevertheless, the roots of violence are more often found outside the confines of regular police work.
In Haiti, a country born out of violence, where chains had to be broken, education is inextricably linked to the lash. Violence suffered requires violence back. In Haiti, it's difficult to accept that it's possible to educate without beating. Society's authoritarianism, and thus its violence, finds its origin in an education which forbids the right to reply and where the education system devalues the maternal language. Authority is seen as the arm which stands behind the system of learning. But people's education in violence also happens outside the schoolroom. Marital violence, violence linked to the redistribution of peasant lands, violence interiorized by its victims, domestic violence, para-political violence such as the 'dechoukaj' and other cases of popular justice are merely the immediate and visible symptoms of a far deeper social and economic violence.
When the gap separating those who run the state and the population is too large, the population takes it out on the police, the state's most direct representatives. Nevertheless, besides incidents implicating the police themselves, the weaknesses of the institution show up in its often strained relations with the population. Violent incidents involving police and communities have occurred in different towns throughout the country (Mirebalais, Milot, Martissant, Saint Michel de l'Attalaye, Cabaret, Pétonville, to name only a few). The police repression which has swept through a number of them has been felt well beyond the towns in question. This series of incidents reveals the survival of brutal and arbitrary behavior at the heart of the police force. . Faced with this, the people have replied with violence.
The PNH lacks means and experience and its numbers are still limited and far from covering the full extent of its territory. But this still can't fully justify and explain such excesses. And while this is serious enough, these are not its only weaknesses. The temptation for police to get rich quick through corruption, drug trafficking and criminal activities is still there. Logistical problems - such as poor communications and the lack of means of transport - present major obstacles to effective function. At the same time, a generalized resistance to cooperating with the population often translates into an explosion of conflicts involving serious violations of human rights. When police have so much trouble handling and controlling the force they represent and respecting the rights of their compatriots, society often finds it hard to accept.
Whatever the case, it needs to be said that social cohesion requires the acceptance of rules valid for all, and for conflict management to function within society. The Haitian state needs to be reconciled with its obligations towards its citizens. Haiti's entire history has been one of struggle between state violence and popular resistance to that state violence. The Haitian state and people need a reconciliation.
The Peace Committee
The Peace Committee was formed in 1991 and was made up of organizers going out to the peasants with the aim of stimulating discussion on the issue of civil society. They soon realized that the divisiveness endemic among the peasants worked to the advantage of the grandons and their managers. That the peasants effectively had a relationship of economic servitude with the grandons which worked against them. They had to pay excessively high rents to managers in order to get land, and only by handing over a large proportion of their harvest earnings could they get out of the relationship. In 1995, after meeting separately with two groups, the committee held a meeting of peasant delegates to discuss their problem. INARA attended one of their workshops and they have continued cooperating since then.
INARA
The National Agrarian Reform Institute (INARA) was proposed in the 1987 Constitution and constituted by a decree in April 1995. INARA is based in the Artibonite at Pont Sondé in the complex housing the Artibonite Valley Development Organization (ODVA). A departmental office, known as the Artibonite Agrarian Reform Departmental Headquarters (DDRAA), is composed of various sections: the inspection and follow-up section, the land registry section, the organization and communication section, and the reconciliation and legal services section. The sections work interdependently with each other.
According to Article 1 of the October 1996 closure bill signed by President Préval, INARA is authorized to take provisional possession, without completing any prior formalities, of all legally disputed land located within the territory of the Republic and reputed to have been originally vacant and/or owned by the State. This means: state land, absentee grandons land, and land in dispute. INARA is currently in its third phase in the Artibonite. This means that, in three stages, it has drawn up three sets of land maps within which a lot of dispute has taken place, and within which a lot of land needs redistributing.
The Land Registry Section
INARA will rule on the management of any land of which it has taken possession, including any installations and/or crops which have been introduced, according to Article 2 of the closure bill mentioned above. The land registry section plays a technical role, that of dividing the land into half-hectare lots and making them available to peasants. It is implied that the land is well irrigated and drained. This work is done in parallel with the ODVA.
The Organization and Communication Section
This section has the role of going into the mapped out areas to explain the reforms in detail and explain how they will be carried out. It functions as a support committee, working through various area representatives (peasant organizations and municipal council representatives) to help individual peasants benefit from the land scheme.
The Follow up/Evaluation Section
All peasants put forward by the support committee are the object of an inquiry by this section. The Artibonite is under considerable demographic pressure and the half hectares offered by the reforms are not enough to satisfy every family head in each of the mapped areas. A lottery of some sort is unavoidable. Nevertheless, selections will be based first on those in most need. A report will be drawn up on each peasant put forward by the support committee. The poorest will receive a parcel of land. The others will be put on a list. All remaining parcels of land will be given a number and all the people on the list will be invited to come to the ODVA complex to draw one. Subsequently, this section will be in charge of supervising the undertaking given by each beneficiary which, in brief, is that they cannot sell, mortgage or give away any part of their land.
In addition, one of the INARA aims is to achieve a higher yield from land left fallow. To this end, beneficiaries are supported by extremely low-interest loans of 1,000 Haitian dollars for buying and providing feed and seeds and for improving walls and fences. This will be done in collaboration with ODVA. Cyclone George recently destroyed a large part of the harvests forecast for this year, so INARA has given peasants a year longer to repay the loans a little at a time.
The Reconciliation/Legal Services Section
I met Chesnel Alphonse in the Artibonite INARA reconciliation section. "We will apply the principle of grande prescription (great limitation) in favor of these occupants," he said. "In the case of homes in open conflict, rulings will favor the first occupants. Land must belong to those who work it." Chesnel was a member of the Peace Committee from 1991 to 1995, before moving on to work with INARA. He also took part in a PBI Training for Trainers course run by Philippe Beck in 1996. Chesnel Alphonse gave me an example of a conflict that INARA had to deal with. In 1999, a person arrived claiming lands which his papers said had been acquired in 1949. Then, in 1951, the current owner had bought the lands and had them registered. Two methods can be used for settling the dispute. In Haiti, prescriptive measures can be taken after a period of 20 years. In this case, either double the legally authorized amount of time had passed, or the claimant had taken no action during the time allowed him. The reconciliation section could have stopped there. Nevertheless, it carried out an inquiry to verify the title deeds. It concluded that the plaintiff had false papers.
After moving in to Pont Sondé in 1995, the INARA reconciliation section received a large number of people lodging complaints. Unlike the courts, it charged nothing. Chesnel Alphonse told me that he believed the explanation for the flood of interest lay in the transparency of the work that was done. "Here we put all the cards on the table," he said. "The principles of participation and debate used in land distribution apply in here as well. Rulings are given in Creole. They are 'grand assemblies', as they say." It's a place where anyone can come and present documents or lodge complaints and where all parties know what is going on. When the parties have reached an agreement, following talks held before a grand assembly, the legal section signs a verbal statement which has the force of law. Anybody who fails to respect the clauses of the contract and the verbal statement will face reprisals. Of course, anybody contravening regulations will not be directly liable to a jail term. New negotiations over the original conditions can be restarted through INARA, with the aim of reaching a better understanding of any inadequacies in the rulings. Nevertheless, Article 4 of the April 1995 decree clearly states that INARA itself can make a decision if no other course proves possible. The work of the legal service also includes compiling a full dossier on all conflicts brought to its attention. If it believes that the investigations into conflicts are inadequate, it sends the dossier to the departmental bureau, or another headquarters office, as well as to the police. A tribunal ruling can then take place with the maximum of guarantees.
Problems heard
While in Lestere, in the Desdunes area, I simply listened to people's criticisms. "It's not always the poorest people who get land." "It's not always a good thing for people to get 1,000 Haitian dollars in one go. They don't manage the money over the long term. They soon find themselves with nothing, and no seeds left." "I've never got my 1,000 dollars; only 700." "People are chosen by the support committee and by the Organization and Communication sections." "You often see people distributing land, even though they aren't part of the zone." "The groupings, the allocation of lands by INARA-ODVA is not good." "Corruption is as big as it ever was before."
I will end with a Haitian proverb which, like proverbs the world over, leaves us thinking. "Lè se baw yap baw yon chwal, you pa baw dwa pou w ouvri bouch li pou wè si dan l pike ou gen lanpa, se swa ke w pran l oubyen pa pran l."
The day they decide to give you a horse, they don't give you the right to open its mouth and look inside. The teeth may be rotten or they may be fine. Maybe you'll take it. Maybe you won't.
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