A large National Gathering of peasants on the theme of Constitution and Agrarian Reform was held last March at Pont-Sondé in the Department of the Artibonite. The Haiti team were there to collect peasants testimonies, and we met again with pleasure some past workshop participants, from the diocese of the Cayes and from the Cahos.
This national meeting of small farmers organized by the National Institute of Agrarian Reform (INARA) was held in the ODVA center, (Organization for the Development of the Valley of the Artibonite), and consisted of more of a thousand small farmers, (Two representatives for every local section in the country). Workshops were held on several topics: the necessity of a country-wide agrarian reform, legal precedents for reform, how it should take place and other projects that are also needed. A summary of participant's views was officially presented to President René Préval, come to celebrate with the peasants the birthday of the Constitution, signed in March 1987.
A Strategic Reform
The President announced that he wants to spread agrarian reform throughout the country over a period of just three months. In order to do this, INARA has to open offices in 14 districts (9 departments and 5 under-districts) covering the whole of the country not yet touched by the reform. This announcement, widely reported, raises big hopes both on the part of peasants, who are marginalized and strangled by the high cost of living and the scarcity of equipment, and on the part of government, committed to a policy of raising national production and establishing social justice.
'You can do it' declared President René Préval: the earth is the root of power. Power for the peasant to provide for his needs and for those of his family, power for the citizen to contribute, in a dignified way, to the struggle for the economic independence of Haiti, power to finally be able to participate in the democratic process of the nation.
How Much Land?
Haiti is characterized by an undiversified, essentially agricultural economy. Two-thirds of the population lives in the countryside, and half of the land area is dedicated to agriculture. The population density is very high in the rural areas, so the land area available to each person is one of the lowest in the world (0.28 hectares per farmer on average). Haitian agriculture, with the exception of the Plain of Artibonite and the Plain of Cul-de-Sac, which are partially converted into larger estates, is the cultivation of mountainous areas by many small subsistence farmers. Between 600-700,000 peasants work in extremely difficult conditions, with very little capital or technology at their disposal. Also the potentially transforming influence of agro-industries is very little developed.
Declining Production
Until the 1980s, agriculture dominated national production. Since then there has been a considerable decline. Thus, in 1996 the agricultural sector only contributed 27% of GDP, against 50% at the beginning of the 1980s. Some export crops that were traditionally the strength of Haiti such as coffee, sisal and cocoa, are today in clear decline. Even more serious than this are decreases in the production of subsistence crops such as rice, corn, sorghum, and bananas.
The absence of investment in the Haitian agricultural sector is one of the biggest obstacles to the development of production: the return on the small investments that have been made have been spent in other economic sectors, and not reinvested in agrarian activities.
During the period of the trade embargo (1992-1994), the decline in production became greater, because of the cessation of aid and the steep increase in price of agricultural inputs such as manure and seeds making them inaccessible to peasants. This was followed by a rise in prices of agricultural products, a relative food shortage for the whole of the population, and the bankrupting of small farmers. Close to 75% of peasant families currently live under the poverty line, in a natural habitat that is degraded by deforestation and erosion.
In this context of extreme misery and marginalization, tensions and conflicts about the possession of land have, until recently, been sources of murderous violence: Jean-Rabel, Bocozelle, Milots are names with tragic overtones now. The objective of agrarian reform is to finally put the land that is usually subject to the law of the strongest, at the disposition of the one who really works it. This aim, registered in the first democratic Constitution of Haiti, ratified in March 1987, did not start to be implemented until 1995.
History of an Overdue Reform
Article 247 of the Constitution of 1987 recognizes that "Agriculture, the main source of national wealth, is guarantor of the well-being of populations and the socioeconomic progress of the nation." It sets out an overview of agricultural politics and expresses the necessity for agrarian reform. How this reform should be organized is dealt with in Article 248: "A special body named The National Institute of Agrarian Reform (INARA), is created in order to organize the fundamental structure of reform and to set in motion an agrarian reform for the benefit of the real workers of the earth. This institute will work out an agrarian politics centered on the optimization of productivity by setting up structures aimed at land protection and land management."
Haiti had to wait for the arrival of Jean-Bertrand Aristide as President, and the emergence of masses of peasants on the political stage, so that in 1991 a committed national policy of agrarian reform could begin. This policy could not be implemented until the return of democratic order after the sinister interruption of the military regime of 1991-1994.
"On April 29, 1995, the Government of the Republic made a Decree regulating the organization and the working of INARA. Until an organic law is voted by the Parliament, INARA's actions will be directed from the precepts of the decree. But this decree itself having been made according to the Constitution, the INARA will have to take the Constitution for a guide". (1)
Objectives of this reform, as stated in the decree, go beyond the achievement of a simple agrarian reform and define a global policy "to fight the marginalization which afflicts the farming masses [...] and to establish a more free society, more just and more democratic ". (2) So, "INARA has as its mission to solve the fundamental problems in a global approach toward agricultural development, of conservation of natural resources and of protection of the environment. "(3) "The actions of INARA are going to concentrate therefore on the realization of three economic objectives: 1° - to assure that agriculture feeds the population (food security); 2° - to develop the contribution of agriculture, by the production of export commodities, to the country's international trade, particularly by improving agricultural productivity; 3° - to widen the market of goods and services by increasing the revenues of the agricultural workers." (4)
Broad Participation
Because the effective involvement of many small farmers was one of the factors known to be crucial for the success of agrarian reform, a national debate on the agrarian reform idea was launched in November 1995. A National Workshop on Agrarian Reform was held, bringing specialists of the FAO, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank together with experts from Haiti and other Caribbean countries. The final report has been submitted for discussion in the regional workshops and in a set of workshops for each sector. In the same way, during 1997, meetings in Port-au-Prince and other places allowed the different sectors of civil society to debate the draft law. These reflections and dialogues continue in 1998, the National Gathering of Pont-Sondé being an example.
Progress of Reform
At the founding of INARA, in July 95, the phase of conflict management began (what Bernard Ethéard, Director of the INARA, calls Phase Zero). For this, as for Phase I and II, the Valley of the Artibonite was chosen as a test area for intervention because of the acuteness and the violence of land conflicts there. At the beginning, INARA was more of a paper organization than anything else. Bernard Ethéard says "in the beginning, it was just me and a car. The diplomatic joke of the time was that INARA meant, I N'a Rien (I have nothing)".(5) The idea was that INARA, being on the spot, and meeting the different parties in land conflicts, could negotiate between them, and so to contribute to avoiding violence.
The decree of the government of Rosny Smarth in October 1996, began Phase I of the reform, allowing INARA to take possession of all lands in disputed ownership and land known to be or to have been, property of absentee landlords and/or the property of the state. During this first phase, 1600 families each received a half hectare. Today, they have added value with the help of technicians of the ODVA and cooperating workers from Taiwan. Indeed, accompanying programs were set up to assure the provision of credit and agricultural inputs such as manure and seeds as well as training in improved planting techniques, and the provision of improved machinery (for example, motor tillers offered by Taiwan and shelling mills stocked by the ODVA)
On November 18, 1997, the birthday of the battle of Vertières that gave Haiti its independence in 1803, President Préval, visiting in the Artibonite, launched Phase II of the reform. In this phase, 3448 families each received a half-hectare of cultivable land.
Balances and Perspectives
A report of the Justice and Peace Commission in August 1997 notes that "INARA has, at the time of the first phase, achieved a concrete success, that the big land massacres have ended, and that the Valley of the Artibonite is no longer a river of blood." (6) In spite of irregularities denounced in some newspapers, or the charges of corruption made against certain members of the Committee of Follow-up of the Reform, it is the opinion of all parties that we were able to meet at Pont-Sondé or elsewhere that violent land conflicts have stopped in the Artibonite. The intervention of INARA allowed the creation of police stations, throughout the Artibonite, creating an outbreak of peace that affects the whole country.
Another positive result is the significant increase in rice production on the redistributed parcels: the average output used to be 2.8 tons to the hectare, but with the last harvest it increased to 4.5 tons. According to the evaluations of the Ministry of Agriculture, Haiti could be self-sufficient in rice by 1999. This brings up the problem of imports. Rice imported from Miami, sold at lower prices than locally-produced rice, continues to flood the markets of the Artibonite and other areas. Article 251 of the Constitution forbids the importation of agricultural commodities that are domestically produced in sufficient quantity on the national market. Even if Haiti no longer produced rice in sufficient quantity, it would be necessary according to some experts to reduce imports immediately, in order to encourage the small farmers to increase their production. The question is whether a weak State can effectively oppose the interests of big importers (for example, if import taxes are increased, the risk is that smuggling will increase also).
Of course, the present agrarian reform has not had unanimous support. Fred Doura in Haiti Progress criticized INARA for not pushing for bigger changes. 'The half-measures taken by INARA will neither affect the shortage of land, nor the pre-capitalist nature of the exploitation of land and peasantry. [...] These half-measures contributed to solving some conflicts between big landowners and a few dozen sharecroppers, and landless peasants in the department of the Artibonite and elsewhere, but are in no way able to encourage a social transformation of Haitian society. They are measures that encourage the development of capitalism, within the policies of neo-liberal ideology, where hundreds of small owners produce for the market each setting their own prices." (7)
A Movement That Carries Hope
However, it is clear that for the small peasants of the Cayes, the Cahos, or Saint-Marc that we met at Pont-Sondé, agrarian reform is their best hope of acquiring enough land to satisfy the basic needs of their family. Food security and access to education and health constitute a first steps towards dignity and social reconstruction: "We peasants are despised. We think that if INARA does its job, it will be able to make big changes both for the present generation and for those that come after. Agrarian reform is going to assure us our food, it is going to get a democracy going. It will help us so that we can become free."(8)
Conscious of the necessity to increase production and to counter erosion and deforestation, the peasants we talked to all emphasized the importance of a single policy and of training in new techniques at the local level, "create agricultural schools in every department, create cooperatives to help people, cooperatives that would give credits to farmers and give technical training." It is necessary in a word to create conditions that demand reform. (9) An effort to develop infrastructure, irrigation projects and roads, these are the expectations of the men and women we met. They were also keen to stop the flow of young peasants to enlarge the urban population: 'You know what happens; sometimes when the country kids arrive in the capital they become assassins, future zenglendos (bandits). ' (10)
Through their organizations, the peasants made numerous propositions, particularly concerning their involvement in the process of reform. They also criticized institutional and practical aspects, asking for example that INARA, beyond the Decree that institutes it, gets legal recognition from Parliament. Decentralization, dialogue and involvement are, for Bernard Ethéard also, the essential conditions to the realization of a democratic project of agrarian reform. Even though the finance for the latest phase (a budget of 44 million Haitian gourds, around US $3 million) for the creation of INARA offices in all zones of the country has not yet been paid in by the international financial backers because of the of the government holiday, peasant organizations are ready for the changes. The reform may usher in a new era of dignity for the countryside, the "Pays En-dehors" and create a fundamental transformation of Haitian society in the next 20 to 25 years.
NOTES AND SOURCES
Notes:When you live in Haiti, it is not easy to speak of globalization. Out in the rural areas daily life is governed by the weather and its influence on the crops. It is also governed by the traditions which recall the African origins of the population, 18th century France and the years that Haiti was a colony. The changes on the Dow Jones and the development of the Internet seem quite far from here.
Nevertheless, even in the most isolated locations, the signs and symbols of the encroaching global order are present. The logo of a famous brand of sports clothing, reproduced more or less skillfully on cheap shirts, and the all-terrain vehicles which zoom by on badly paved roads are signs that the world goes faster and faster and that Haiti will not escape from the big dance.
Today, incontestably, the most important factor involved in the integration of Haiti into the global system is the strong presence of the international community. The numerous institutions have an aggressive influence on the decision-making structure and economy of the country. In the principal daily papers one may read in Port-au-Prince, one finds that international and Non-Governmental Organizations represent the majority of employment opportunities. The effects of this presence, appreciated in different ways and to different degrees by Haitians, are tangible: rent increases and changing attitudes.
What Future for Freedom?
The Haitian rural society has so far succeeded in rejecting the different attempts at exploitation made by international commerce. Cash crops like sugar cane, vetiver or sisal have not been widely produced compared with the production of food crops. Contrast this with countries like the Dominican Republic or other Central American countries who have become 'tropical gardens' in service to the Northern economies, selling them bananas and sugar.
Despite the efforts of successive governments since Independence in 1804, Haitian peasants have universally refused the system of plantations and wage-earning, instead developing a subsistence agriculture which has spread as far as marginal or distant regions like the mountainous areas. The peasants believed in creating a barely monetarized and frugal economy, based on solidarity; so, correspondingly, they have tried to keep away from anything which even remotely resembles a consumer society.
Changed for the Worse
Today, Haiti seems to have nothing more to offer to the global market than its extremely cheap and skillful labor for the multinational textile and manufacturing enterprises. These industries generally turn to local sub-contractors which are sited mostly in the industrial zone of Port-au-Prince. The working conditions in these industries are often revolting; the employers profit by the miserable conditions of the worker.
The chronic weakness of the State officials and its lack of control over the territories of Haiti attracts other unscrupulous actors onto the stage. Thus, Haiti has become, since the start of the eighties, a hub of drug trafficking; drugs are transported from South America through Haiti to the United States and Europe. The frequent cocaine seizures at the international airport or on the southern coasts can only give an small impression of the importance of the flow of drugs.
And for Better?
Speaking of the internationalization of Haiti also evokes images of the thousands of young men and women who, since the times of the Duvalier dictatorship, have left the country to find their fortune elsewhere. Often well educated and trained, they have, by way of this exodus, contributed to the chronic lack of an enterprising middle class in this country. For example, there are more Haitian doctors and nurses in Canada than there are here in Haiti.
Today, cheaper flights and the ease of moving money internationally makes this out of country or exile Haitian community (people call it the "Tenth Department" or the "Diasporas") a decisive economic factor, through their investments in the country or by the activities they develop on their return.
However, the impact of this community on the local economy is not always positive. Because of the size of their incoming revenues, they contribute to increasing costs in housing and services and they get offered the most coveted jobs.
So, the current boom in building construction, (a sixty percent growth rate in the last six years according to official figures), contributes to the assets of these 'Diasporas'; houses built in anticipation of their return, or financed as an investment in the country. Numerous service enterprises, such as in computers, training, and shops and stores, are participating in this movement.
The return of these well-trained individuals, having access to capital and being in a good position to get official posts in the bureaucracy, is sometimes perceived as unfair competition for the Haitians who stayed behind. However, as the example of the Chinese Diaspora in Southeast Asia shows, these 'Tenth Department' voices can only contribute to Haiti's full participation in the global concert.
The issue of privatization is undoubtedly one of the hot points on the Haitian political landscape, since it polarizes political life at the level of the Chambre des Députés.
The Lavalassien Movement, that makes up almost all the seats in the Chambre basse (lower house), is effectively divided in two with the OPL (Organization of the People in Struggle, a liberal and technocratic tendency) opposing the Bloc Anti-Néo-Libéral, whose name exactly describes its program. Beyond ideological and partisan considerations, at stake in the privatization process that Haiti is committed to for good or bad, is the economic future of the poorest country in the western hemisphere.
Public Enterprises: the End of an Age
Privatization of public enterprises is becoming the rule around the world, as the sole possibility for capitalist economies. The time where States reserved for themselves the control of strategic activities such as telecommunications, energy, transports, mining is past. If for a long time, these undertakings could have served as tools for a politics of development, they have worked too often with limited economic efficiency.
Many governments saw it indeed as the means of distributing rewards to their partisans, through well-paid positions and advantageous commercial contracts. The Haitian public sector is a grotesque example of this tendency. In these enterprises, large workforces and low productivity are owed to the fact that you only have to know someone well-placed to find a position (of course, this is not in reach of everybody).
The Logic of Privatization
It is now admitted, at least by investors and international organizations as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, that the private sector is capable of providing many public utility services, at the least cost for the economy (but not necessarily for the final consumer). Competition is a big stimulant for economic efficiency.
The governments of France, Germany, Brazil and other countries have progressively accepted to this logic, and are privatizing many public utilities. It would not look good that Haiti, whose national budget is 60% financed by international aid, could do otherwise, although many local political actors are not necessarily supportive.
Employees of these enterprises however are alert and have a voice. Here as in the industrialized countries, indeed, salaried employees and unions oppose a logic that convinces financiers. This is not enough to prevent that, in a logical way, Hervé Dennis, the designated prime minister, put privatizations on his agenda, but used the less charged word modernization.
What to Privatize?
The two main candidates for privatization today are Electricité D'Haïti (EDH), and Télécommunications d'Haïti (TELECO), after the Minoterie et le Ciment d'Haïti have been sold off by the state in 1997.
These two enterprises represent publicly owned firms that are governed by political aims rather than economics. Workforces are large, productivity is low (TELECO manages 100,000 lines with 2800 employees, 36 lines per employee, more than three times less than the norm), and rivalries within management make setting economic objectives difficult.
Considering their central importance in the economic life and the daily of the Haitians, two questions arise: What interest would international investors have in these enterprises, and what would be the impact of their privatization on the economic development of the country?
The picture offered by EDH is dark (is this partly because of the frequent blackouts?). The unreliability of the service has forced all comfortable Haitian homes to be equipped with a rechargeable battery system in order to have more or less continuous electricity. The network is maintained badly and is overloaded with 'Cumberlands'. These are illegal connections, that take their name from a civil servant of the American occupation who was noted for always choosing the quickest methods to solve any problem. As a result, close to the half of the electricity generated at the power station generates no income. Large generators such as the power station of Varreux depend for the rest on international aid money (at present from the European Union) for the costs of upkeep and of keeping them in service.
The TELECO case is more complex. On one hand, this enterprise is profitable, thanks to the, international calls of the Haitian communities of the United States and Canada. On the other, many places around the country are deprived for years of telephone service, even supposing that they will ever get it. There is a waiting list of about ten thousand enterprises and individuals but none of these are holding their breath.
Will the privatization of TELECO bring the Haitian population the same level of service as developed countries? This is not certain. In Haiti as elsewhere, the private operators prefer to aim their services at the wealthiest customers. Mobile telephony, international lines, access to the Internet and data transfer are the most profitable areas.
Thus, a Haitian investor group launched at the beginning of April a service of portable cellular telephones. The 4000 lines that they propose will find takers quickly. In the North of the country, some businessmen in fact subscribe to telephone networks of the Dominican Republic, on the other side of the border, where antennas enough powerful exist to cover their locality!
Privatization for Whom?
Looking at what matters to most of the population, things look less rosy. The development of one intended service important to less well-off customers, the installation of telephone boxes, proved to be too expensive, while the new technologies are also out of reach of those with lower incomes. The development of the electricity network hinges on the same problem of how to finance production, with the power stations and hydroelectric dams are dependent on international aid for their upkeep and their development.
The privatization of the Haitian public enterprises is being carried out because of a basic economic logic from the point of view of investors and international financial organizations. It seems for the moment that this process may also contribute to the economic development and to well-being of the population of the country.
Each of the three members of the Haiti team has had the opportunity to co-facilitate a training workshop on conflict management or the use of participatory methods in teaching.
First, Chantal left for the Southern Department of Haiti at the end of February. She was accompanied by Dominique, a member of the group of trainers who, along with the rest of us, took part in the Ennery seminar (see March 1998 bulletin). They led the first of a series of workshops which are responding to a request by the Justice and Peace Commission of the Cayes Diocese. The themes were the analysis of conflict and an introduction to nonviolent conflict management.
At the beginning of March, Alfred returned to the Cahos, the location of his initial Creole immersion, to facilitate a workshop with Orel, another of the participants in the Ennery training of trainers group. The workshops aim at training new recruits for the Groupe Rezolisyon Konfli (Conflict Resolution Group). This is a group that evolved out of the workshops given at Chenot earlier (see March 1998 bulletin). In order to strengthen the individual's sense of autonomy within the group, one day has been dedicated to consensus decision making.
At the end of March, Stephane finally took his turn on the road to the Cayes Diocese, in order to facilitate with Jacques (yet another friend from Ennery!) another workshop for the Justice and Peace Commission.
We have dedicated an equal amount of time to our outreach and education work, with interviews of officials and truly fascinating meetings with the active members of different grassroots groups.
The agenda of the weeks and months to come is also extremely full. In particular, we are anticipating preparatory visits, the first workshops of the series preparing for the trainer training of July-August, and the preparation for the PBI-Haiti Project Committee meeting in Port-au-Prince.
The training seminar for PBI volunteers in Germany led to the selection of four people whom we hope to see joining our team in Haiti very soon. There's plenty of work to do!
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